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The human rights/multinationals 
problematic: values, values and  
values.  
Does the Quality of science matter? 
 





Introduction: Qualifying the Problem. 
 
“Human rights and multinationals: is there a problem?” 
(Muchlinski, 2001:31). The traditional human rightist’s answer to Peter 
Muchlinski’s question is first of all informed by the practices of human 
rights violations; secondly by the ontology and/or epistemology of 
human rights; thirdly by methodological choices; and last - and 
unfortunately also least - by the Quality of science. The problem in that 
answer is neither that human rightists’ “focus [their] attention on reality 
under the guidance of values” (Weber, 1904:4,32), nor that their 
‘pragmatism’ actually results in ontological, epistemological and 
methodological pluralism (Baert, 2005). The scientific problem lies in 
the danger that scientific quality is lost “in the presence of value 
judgments” (Weber, 1904:32) or that scientific elaboration does not 
transcend the level of ordinary ‘conversation’ (Baert, 2005:153).   
 
In this paper I want to reflect on the impact of the relationship 
between ‘value judgments’, the ‘suspension’ of criticism and 








I will do this on the basis of an assessment of two different 
strands of scientific epistemology: Quantificationism and 
Interpretationism. These epistemologies are represented in the studies of 
Meyer en Smith et al on the one side and Avery and Forsythe on the 
other. I have reflected upon these studies, because they demonstrate that 
the Quality of science is neither to be found in one specific ontology, 
epistemology or methodology, nor in rhetoric and storytelling. The 
‘Dynamic Quality’ of science is to be found in the dialectics of the 
objective and the subjective.1 
 
The pre-1980ties, human rights discourse has been characterized 
by Wilson as a “expansive transnational legal discourse” (Wilson, 
1997:1).2 It was the ‘valued reality’ of Legal Positivism, which 
qualified that discourse as an example of ‘the paradigmatic case for 
hermeneutics’ (Habermas, 1999:29). The Neo-liberal turn and the 
ontological shift of Social-Constructivism, in the late 1970 and 1980ties 
brought both ‘norms’ as well as ‘interpretationism’ ‘back into’ the 
social sciences (Forsythe, 2000a:3, Donnelly, 1999). However, the ‘re-
imagining’ of Social-Constructivism rather matched the ‘re-
interpretation’ of the Legal Positivism then that it critically reflected on 
the ontology of the mainstream legal scholar (Alston, 2005:3). The re-
                                                
1 The concept of ‘Quality’ is taken from Robert Pirsig. While it cannot and should not 
be defined according to Pirsig, it can ‘be found only in the relationship between the 
two with each other’. Pirsig refers in this context to the ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’. 
PIRSIG, R. M. (1985) Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance : an inquiry into 
values, New York, Bantam Books. One could also refer to the perceived dichotomy 
between the ‘fact’ and the ‘value’, the ‘statistical’ and the ‘hermeneutical’, the 
‘rational’ and the ‘emotional’, the ‘structure’ and the ‘agency’. The idea of a 
confrontation between the rational and the pre-rational or mythical man is also to be 
found in Horkheimer and Adorno’s interpretation of the Odysseus’ trials and 
tribulations as the Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
HORKHEIMER, M. & ADORNO, T. W. (1972) Dialectic of enlightenment, [New 
York], Herder and Herder. 
2 The disciplinary hegemony of (international) law was reinforced by the relative lack 
of interest of social sciences in the ‘human rights phenomena. Anthropologists have 
explained that lack of interest by referring to Anthropology’s “methodological 
emphasis on localism” and “theoretical concerns with culture” which in effect resulted 
in a critical posture to “universal values and transnational processes such as ‘human 
rights’” WILSON, R. A. (1997) Human Righhts, Culture and Context: An 
Introduction. IN WILSON, R. A. (Ed.) Human Rights, Culture & Context; 
Antropological Perspectives. London, Pluto Press.. In international relations it was the 
state-centered ontology of Political Realism, which prevented the first generation of 
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introduction of a quantitative/naturalist dimension by William Meyer, 
(1996) triggered an interesting but short methodological/meta-
theoretical debate between exponents of the naturalistic community 
(Smith et al., 1999, Meyer, 1999); …the non-quantitative epistemic 
community remained conspicuously calm on this matter.3 Meyer’s 
extensive justification of the ‘appropriateness’ of the quantitative 
approach given the nature of the subject questioned the ethics of the 
quantitative methods.4  
 
For the purpose of this paper, scientific Quality is defined as the 
variable, which stimulates the dynamics in scientific processes. 
Bringing values into that process can either stimulate or curb the 
dynamics of science and thereby affecting scientific quality both 
positively and negatively. Weber was right when he noted both that “we 
focus our attention on reality under the guidance of values” and that 
“criticism is not to be suspended in the presence of value judgments” 
(Weber, 1904:4,32). The Quality of science requires just that, no matter 
what values we introduce into the science. 
 
In this paper I will touch upon the problematic of ‘valuing’ in 
the multinationals/human rights debate on the basis of comparing the 
positions of William Meyer, Chris Avery and David P. Forsythe, whose 
articles are equally informed by the ‘human rights value’, but differ in 
terms of scientific quality. As such, this paper reflects on the specific 
ontology of human rights and the possible consequences of the 
underlying metaphysical assumptions on the methodologies and 
theories of human rights.  
 
                                                
3 The Human Rights Quarterly is one of the leading journals in the field, which 
supports the assumption that the Meyer article must have been widely received.  
4 It has to be stressed here that a employing a quantitative method cannot be compared 
to the experimental testing with living creatures. In the latter case the confining effect 








The Meyer – Smith et al debate: The Quality of 
Quantification 
 
William H. Meyer sets out to ‘test’ “[t]wo theories of 
multinational corporations and human rights, the engines of 
development thesis and the Hymer thesis [by taking] indicators of direct 
foreign investment to measure the presence of multinational 
corporations.” (Meyer, 1996:1). According to Meyer, such “ [e]mperical 
analysis will inform moral and legal studies of MNCs” (Meyer, 
1996:273). In that, Meyer is in a dual sense a Durkheimian. He not only 
adheres to the Durkheimian believe in statistics as a methodological 
device to isolate social facts and to observe them in their ‘pure 
state’(Durkheim, 1982: 3), but also he also shares Durkheim’s social 
engagement. To the extent, however, that Meyer can be labeled as a 
‘social engineer’, he is however closer to Popper’s ‘piecemeal 
engineering’ (Popper, 1968). His study furthermore entails the features 
of a ‘risky prediction that Popper could also have appreciated. (Popper, 
1968:36). Meyer’s demonstrates that he is clearly informed by the 
shortcoming of quantification and the special character of human rights 
as he agrees with Goldstein’s opinion that:” [w]hat is needed is a 
combination: statistical information which is reliable and meaningful; 
non-statistical information which is meaningful and reliable and 
judgment to”(Meyer, 1996:382). It is in the questioning of both the 
methodological aspects of quantification as well as its as well as the 
philosophical/normative dimension of quantification that the ‘Quality’ 
of Meyer’s quantification is to be found. However, his 1996 article 
Meyer explicitly raises the question whether “quantitative studies of 
human rights” are “justifiable” in response to the critics that “To 
quantify is necessarily to depersonalize and even dehumanize a topic’s 
content” and that “the essential nature of human rights is qualitative not 
quantitative (Meyer, 1996:380,381). However, he also acknowledges 
the claim that “quantitative studies advance theoretical understandings 








Meyers’ arguments did not refrain Smith et al from questioning 
Meyers’ (a) ‘world-views’ (b) ‘paradigms’ and (c) “philosophies of 
science”/”meta-theoretical conceptions”.  
a. Meyer’s ‘reality is that of the MNC as a 
‘moral’ and ‘social’ actor (Meyer, 1996:273), whereas 
Smith et al think of TNCs as predominantly 
economic/profit oriented actors (unless they are pressed 
by societal and/or legal forces)(Smith et al., 1999:207) 
b. These world views are then reflected in 
the Meyer’s Liberal and Smith et al’s Critical stance in 
terms of IR Theory, which then corresponds with their 
‘empirical’ findings that is MNC are respectively 
beneficial or detrimental to the promotion of the 
development and human rights of a country  
c. In terms of meta-theoretical conceptions 
then, Smith et al, seeking to implicitly falsify Meyer’s 
analysis by testing their “assertions about the limitations 
of the data used in [that analysis]”(Smith et al., 
1999:214). Meyer, response invoked Lakatos in order to 
rebuff Smith et al’s implicit claim to have ‘falsified’ his 
‘results’. (Meyer, 1999).  
 The ‘problematic of the logic of Falsificationism’, which is 
predominantly a debate amongst ‘methodological naturalists’ (Baert, 
2005:61), constituted only a small portion of the debate. Much of the 
debate concerned the character of human rights and the inherent values 
and was highly interpretative in character. Addressing and accounting 
for the normative character of this ‘problematic’ by asking and 
answering the question whether quantification is ‘justifiable’ and 
‘appropriate’, Meyer did not satisfied Smith et al’s concern that 
“Meyers earlier findings, which support neoliberal assumptions [which] 
policy makers could interpret these findings to mean less need for 
international regulation.” (Meyer, 1996:382-384)Agreeing to Meyer’s 
‘combination of approaches’, Smith et al suggest that the problematic is 
‘more complex’ then the quantitative approaches would suggest. (Smith 
et al., 1999:218). Meyer and Smith et al would agree to Popper’s 
criteria of ‘falsifiability’, ‘refutability’ and ‘testability, but do not agree 








at stake (Popper, 1968). Because this refusal of a strict line of 
demarcation is value informed is cannot be interpreted as a fall to ones 




Avery and Forsythe: The Quality of Interpretation 
 
Chris Avery, former legal adviser to Amnesty International and 
current Director of the London based Business & Human Rights 
Resource Centre and David P. Forsythe, a political scientist, have 
adopted an interpretative approach to the problematic. Both authors are 
clearly informed by the values of human rights.  
 
Avery focuses on the impact of economic developments and 
globalization on "society and its values” a questioning of which is 
according to Avery “ well underway and which makes it] important for 
companies – and for human rights advocates dealing with companies – 
to recognize these fundamental changes and to adapt them to the new 
world” (Avery, 2000:17). 
 
To Avery a ‘new’ world and the changes in ‘society and its 
values’ appear to be ontologically given. What needs to be done is to 
make adaptations, which are in accordance with the ‘given’ structural 
changes. In this Avery seems to be ‘somewhat’ of a Critical Realist, 
who recognize both structure and agency, but understands structure as 
informing agency (Baert, 2005:97). Avery’s reality however is confined 
to the actual. A deeper knowledge aim is not envisaged. Avery’s 
narrative is a classical example of the hermeneutics of the traditional 
legal academics and his account is clearly informed by the ‘values of 
human rights’.(Avery, 2000)  
 
He observes and reports a ‘change in business thinking, which is 
challenging the “traditional argument that human rights do not need to 
be a priority “ through a valued lens (Avery, 2000:19-22) The basic 
reason for this is that “Society is calling on business to act.”(Avery, 
2000:29-51) This ‘calling’ results in “steps towards change” in business 
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slow response to the new realities…[and that] .in the new millennium 
most companies have still not come to terms with the new reality…” 
(Avery, 2000:69). Avery’s ‘new reality’ is what one could understand 
in Critical Realists language at the most as the ‘actual reality’. Avery’s 
narrative, however does not even establish a ‘pattern of events that take 
place,’ (Baert, 2005:92). It is not an example of Habermas’ idea of 
hermeneutics. i.e. serving the accomplishment if “a common 
understanding or shared view” (Habermas, 1999). Avery’s rhetoric 
serves to support the ‘idea’ of a ‘new reality’. Even in the absence of 
paradigmatic meaning, the distinction between rhetoric and hermeneutic 
has to be drawn (Taylor, 1971).  
 
Forsythe’s, honors the ontology of Political Realism only partly 
as he perceives the world ‘out there’ as ‘dominated by states and their 
collective interest [but] The subject of human rights projects liberalism 
into the realist world. ”(Forsythe, 2000a:4/1). Thereby Forsythe 
integrates the ontology of Neo-Realism and Neo Liberalism in one 
study, and adds the ‘myth of ontological purity’ to the ‘myth of 
scientific method’ (Baert, 2005:131), thus opening up for critique from 
both sides. 
 
With respect to the activities of multinational companies, 
Forsythe argues “ that it remains reasonable to expect that if left alone, 
many TNCs will opt for short term profits at the expense of human 
dignity for many persons affected directly and indirectly by there 
practices.” (Forsythe, 2000b:199). In this respect, Forsythe displays the 
general skepticism of the average, critically informed, human rights 
researcher. The only two Tables in his monograph ‘compares’ states 
and ‘the world’s largest TNCs in terms of billion US$ (Forsythe, 
2000b:192-193) intend to serve rather then to inform the argument 
concerning the “tremendous effect transnational corporations have on 
persons in the modern world, for good or ill” (Forsythe, 2000b). 
 
Like Avery, Forsythe observes developments, which are 
“getting TNCs to pay more attention to human rights standards”. Unlike 
Avery however, Forsythe does not see a ‘new reality’ but a ‘new 
psychological environment in which TNCs are expected to engage in 








 differs from Avery in that he explicitly raises the normative point in 
question: Should [there] be more public regulation of TNCs in the name 
of human rights? (Forsythe, 2000b:194). In answering that question, 
Forsythe takes an intermediate, albeit skeptical, standpoint between the 
“ a critical view” and “a more positive view’ on “the social and political 
workings of capitalism over time” (Forsythe, 2000b).5 Both Hymer as 
well as Meyer are referred to as exponents of the ‘critical’ respectively 
the more positive view (Forsythe, 2000b).  
 
Human Rights Ontology and the Quality of science 
 
In order to classify the “background social theories of human 
rights” in ontological and epistemological terms, Dunne and Wheeler 
have designed the following quadrant (Dunne and Wheeler, 1999:4).  
      
              Ontology 













Dunne and Wheeler make clear that both the human rights 
ontology as well as epistemology is value based. Again, that is not the 
problem. The Quality of science is not threatened by values or multiple 
values as such, but by values, which curb critical reflection. In Dunne 
and Wheeler’s scheme, I would classify Avery as a ‘foundational liberal 
natural rightist’. Combining an absolute ontology with an absolute 
epistemology would leave little room for what Baert calls ‘academic 
                                                
5 Both Hymer as well as Meyer are referred to as exponents of the ‘critical’ 
respectively the more positive view.FORSYTHE, D. P. (2000b) Transnational 
Corporations and human rights. IN FORSYTHE, D. P. (Ed.) Human Rights in 
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 exchange’ (Baert, 2005). So defined, the Pragmatic notion of 
‘conversation’ converges with Habermas’ Communicative realm, which 
is essential to critical refection (Habermas, 1999). Meyer and Forsythe 
open themselves up to critics as they explicate their ontological starting 
point as well as their (meta) theoretical conceptions. Avery’s narrative 
has to be qualified as a mere rhetoric and has to be disqualified as 
scientific. Pragmatism too has to disqualify ‘science’ which curbs 
pluralism and conversation. The ‘science as solidarity project’,(Rorty, 
1991) must necessarily end where solidarity is detrimental to the 
Quality of science. 
 
The ‘Quality of Science’ assumes [if we do not adhere to post-
modern nihilistic conception of science) that we can differentiate 
between [1] different knowledge realms with their different truisms that 
is: between scientific and non-scientific claims, truisms and knowledge 
and [2] that we can differentiate between good and bad science, i.e. that 
we can determine the Quality of Science. The Quality of science is to be 
found in the encounter of two realms: the subjective and objective; the 
normative and the neutral; the qualitative and the quantitative; the value 
and the fact. Studies which have scientific Quality, are both informed 
by and informing that encounter. Meyer’s study can be considered to 
represent that dynamic and bare this scientific Quality, Forsythe’s 
interpretative narrative is scientific because it represents different 
opinions and refers to different findings. The normative position of the 
author does not contain the scientific debate by static ‘is’ or ‘ought’ 
propositions. Chris Avery’s narrative cannot be considered to constitute 
a ‘piece of science’. It is an enumeration of cases and opinions with the 
sole purpose of making a point and convincing the reader. It’s a typical 
and traditional piece of legal rhetoric. It is about establishing an inter-
subjective truth based on ‘is’ statements. Such narratives have no 
scientific quality and are detrimental to the scientific project.  
 
The Quality of Science is neither the same as the essence of 
science, which according to Baert is a non-starter (Baert, 2005:148) nor 
can it be found in only one ‘truly scientific’ method, ontology or 








 of science is inherently diversified in the sense that two 
different ontologies may have the same quality in that they stimulate 
rather then curb the dynamic of scientific discourse and study.  This 
Quality is equally to be found in both studies informed by Naturalism 
(Durkheim, 1982) and Falsificationism (Popper, 1968) as well as 
Interpretationism (Weber, 1904) and the Critical and Interdisciplinary 
approach of the Frankfurter Schule (Habermas, 1999). Even in 
Pragmatism’s ‘self-referential knowledge (Baert, 2005) there is 
scientific Quality. The philosophers of science tend to agree on one 
characteristic of science it has to further that very scientific endeavor. If 
the accumulation of scientific understanding and knowledge is science’s 
end, then but only then, every scientific means is justified. 
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